FEDERAL INTERVENTION UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

By Charles Wallace Collins, M.A., Sometime Fellow in the University of Chicago. Member of the Alabama Bar.
It is not the purpose of this article to enter into a discussion of the philosophy of the relation of the States to the Federal government, nor to give an exhaustive treatment of the cases here cited. It is proposed to show in outline the development and trend of the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment in its direct and positive restraint upon the several States within the past forty-three years. The attempt is made to set forth the different spheres of State activity affected and the various classes of laws which have been annulled in whole or in part.
From the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 to the close of its last term, the Supreme Court of the United States has handed down six hundred and four opinions under that article of the Constitution. Of these applications for Federal intervention by way of restraining or annulling State action, only fifty-five were decided adversely to the states-that is to say about nine per cent.
The accompanying chart reveals something of the history and the trend of these instances of intervention. Prior to 1885 there were four such cases, each of which involved the negro race question.
These grew out of the problems of the Reconstruction. Since 1886 there have been only two cases of intervention on matters relating to the negro race, while every other instance except twelve has been in behalf of a private corporation seeking relief from State activity, to wit: thirty-nine cases.
For this entire period of forty-three years Federal intervention under the amendment has affected four State constitutions, thirtytwo statutes and nine city ordinances, and State procedureadministrative, executive or judicial-has been restrained eleven times. Thirty-six of these cases reached the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error to the State court, sixteen by appeal from injunctions in the inferior Federal courts and three by other appeals from the Federal courts. Within the past five years nearly one-half of the cases of Federal intervention have been by the way of Federal injunctions. Out of the total number of cases of intervention twenty-one involved the interpretation of some other clause of the Constitution, eight of these being the commerce clause. In eight cases the merits were left undecided, and in thirty-eight-a little over one-half-there were dissenting opinions.
It is apparent that all of these cases are not of equal importance. Some of them involve the technicalities of legal procedure. Others deal with questions no longer alive in the body politic.
Others annul statutes and declare principles of prime importance. While the total number of interventions is not significant as compared with the total number of opinions handed down, yet their effect has been far-reaching on the relations of the States to the Federal government. The restraining of the activity of one State lays down in some measure the metes and bounds for the other States. Social and economic movements involving several States have been thus checked in their incipiency.
Let us now pass to a more definite consideration of these instances of intervention with a view of seeing more clearly this phase of the practical operation of the amendmerit.
We shall consider first certain miscellaneous cases of more or less importance, but which represent isolated instances of Federal intervention. We shall then proceed to study the more important groups.
i. Presumption of death. Under probate procedure in the State of Washington, a certain man having been absent from the State for seven years, and whose whereabouts were unknown, was declared to be dead and letters of administration were issued. He subsequently reappeared and brought suit in ejectment to recover the land. An State. A foreign gas company secured a Federal injunction, restraining the execution of the statute on the ground of violation of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution and also of deprivation of property without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The commerce clause was the predominant issue.
On appeal by the State the injunction was sustained. 10 Holmes, Lurton and Hughes, JJ., dissented. 6. Anti-trust legislation. A statute of Illinois for the prevention of monopolies, exempted agricultural products and live stock in the hands of the producer from the operation of the law.", On appeal from proceedings in a Federal court, the Supreme Court of the United States declared the act void on the ground that the exemption above mentioned denied the equal protection of the laws in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 iMcKenna, J., dissented.
7. City problems. (i) Regulation of the price of gas. The city of Peoria, Illinois, passed an ordinance fixing the maximum price of gas at seventy-five cents per one thousand cubic feet of eighteen candle power." The gas company petitioned for a Federal injunction to restrain the enforcement of the ordinance on the grounds that the rate violated the contract clause of the Constitution and was confiscatory by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Upon a denial of the petition by the lower court an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States whereupon the lower court was reversed and ordered to grant a temporary injunction pending the taking of testimony. The merits of the case were not decided.
(2) Prescribing lawful territory for gas works. An ordinance of Los Angeles limited the erection of gas works to certain sections of the city. A later amendment made some changes in the territory prescribed by the original ordinance, thereby excluding from the lawful territory a certain gas plant.'
Upon proceed- ings in the State courts, the owner of the gas works set up the claim that the amendment of the original ordinance deprived him. of his property without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State courts upheld the validity of the ordinance. Upon writ of ertor the Supreme Court of the United States held that the amendment to the ordinance was "an arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the police power" and therefore void by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment." (3) Public convenience and safety. The city of San Francisco passed an ordinance regulating certain phases of the laundry business.' 7 Certain Chinese set up the claim that the manner in which it was being enforced deprived them'of the equal protection of the laws in contravention of the Fourteenth AmendmentUpon certain proceedings had in the State courts and in the lower Federal court, the matter was decided in favor of the city. Upon appellate proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States both the State and the Federal courts were reversed and the contention of the Chinese upheld.
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(4) Street improvement. The ordinances, one involving an assessment for street paving in Des Moines against the property of a non-resident, and the other a proceeding to condemn certain property for opening a street in the village of Norwood, Ohio, were held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth AmendmentThe Iowa case was tried in the State courts.
1 ' In the Ohio case a Federal injunction was allowed restraining the enforcement of the ordinance.
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Brewer, Gray and Shiras, JJ., dissented. (5) Regulation of street railways. An ordinance of the-city of Cleveland, Ohio, fixed the title to certain rails, poles, and other apparatus owned by the street railway company, in the city, to take effect at the expiration of the franchise. 21 The company procured a Federal injunction restraining the enforcement of the ordinance on the ground of the violation of the contract clause of the Constitution and also, of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Upon appellate proceedings this con- was enjoined by the Federal court upon the petition of the telephone company.
A permanent injunction was allowed on the ground that the rates were confiscatory in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On appeal by the city the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed the appellate proceedings on the ground that the Federal question under the Amendment did not properly appear from the pleadings. The Supreme Court of the United States, upon writ of error, declared the same void both as a violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution and of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the rate being' considered unreasonably high. Harlan and Brewer, JJ., dissented. 22 Kentucky. Taxation of a franchise in Indiana. 40 The proceedings were similar to the above, the tax being held void under the due process clause of the amendment. 4 ' Fuller, C. J., and Shiras,
Kentucky. Taxation of whiskey stored in Germany by owners in Kentucky who held the warehouse receipts.
The tax was declared void under the due process clause of the amendment under procedure similar to the above. of the United States held that it violated the due process clause of the Amendment in that it worked a deprivation of the liberty of contract.
5 " (b) Indiana. Pennsylvania. A judgment was received in a Pennsylvania State court against an insurance company under a statute providing that service of process on the insurance commissioner was sufficient notice.
5 8 "Full faith and credit" was given this judgment in the Indiana courts. Upon writ of error the Supreme Court of the United States declared both judgments void in that the service on the insurance commissioner was insufficient, thereby violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case the construction of a charter of 1847 was involved.
Upon proceed- On appeal the Supreme Court of the United States granted a temporary injunction with instructions to refer the case to a master to ascertain the facts.
8 " (i) Michigan. A statute of Michigan provided, among other things, that i,ooo-mile railroad tickets should be valid for two years from the date of purchase and redeemable within that time at the rate of three cents per mile.
T After procedure in the State courts in which the provision was declared valid, the Supreme Court of the United States, upon writ of error, held it to be void under the due process and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The foregoing bare outline of facts is shown here void of local coloring. The peculiar circumstances which gave rise to the laws in question, the reasons which led the State courts to uphold them, and the public opinion of the States which approved them cannot be shown in this study, nor can they be fully understood by those Within the past forty-three years twenty-five States have been directly affected by Federal intervention under the Amendment." This involved the annulment in whole or in part of thirty-two statutes, nine city ordinances, and a portion of four State constitutions. As to the total number of the fifty-five instances of intervention, eleven were made under the equal protection clause of the Amendment, six of these involving the right of negroes to sit on juries; fourteen were made under the equal and the due process of law clauses considered together; and the remaining thirty were made under the due process of law clause alone, two as deprivations of liberty without due process of law, and twentyeight as taking property without due process of law.
Although there are before us six hundred and four opinions handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment, in fifty-five of which the Federal government was allowed to intervene in the affairs of the State, it is very difficult to formulate general principles governing this intervention.
The terms "due process of law" and "equal protection of the laws," for this purpose, mean nothing in themselves. They gain their meaning only from the conditions and circumstances of each particular case. Matters of time, space and manner govern their interpretation. They cannot be detached from the concrete local environment.
However, we can trace the path in which Federal intervention has heretofore moved and see something of its chronological development.
The first instance of intervention was in 1879, eleven years after the adoption of the Amendment, when a law of the State of West Virginia was declared void because it excluded negroes from the jury service 0 In 1885 the enforcement of an ordinance in California was restrained on account of discrimination against the Chinese. 
